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Abstract
Undiscounted utilitarianism as a criterion of intergeneration justice has been
questioned for different reasons: It has been argued (1) that any complete ordering of
allocations with an infinite number of generations guaranteeing an optimal allocation
must involve discounting, and (2) that undiscounted utilitarianism subjects the
present generation to heavy demands and leads to outcomes that do not appeal to
our ethical intuitions. In a previous work (Asheim, Buchholz & Tungodden,
forthcoming in J. Env. Econ. Man.) we have shown that equal treatment of different
generations is not incompatible with the existence of maximal allocations, given that
one considers technologies that are productive (in a given sense). In this paper we
consider the second argument. We show within three classes of technologies
(linear, Ramsey and Dasgupta-Heal-Solow tech-nologies) that undiscounted
utilitarianism is so malleable that any efficient and non-decreasing allocation can be
the unique optimum given the utilitarian criterion, provided that the utility function is
appropriately chosen. Hence, undiscounted utilitarianism allows for optimal
allocations and need not lead to unequal distributions imposing a too heavy burden
on the present generation.
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AS A CRITERION OF INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE
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Abstract. We show within three technological environments that any
eﬃcient and non-decreasing allocation can be the unique optimum ac-
cording to undiscounted utilitarianism for some choice of utility function.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: D63, Q32
Keywords: Utilitarianism, Intergenerational justice
1. Introduction
In the theory of economic growth it is quite common to determine optimal
growth programs by means of a discounted utilitarian criterion, where the
positive discount rate reﬂects pure time preference. Future utilities of con-
sumption measured on a cardinal scale are through discounting transformed
into present values, the sum of which one seeks to maximize. Thus, dis-
counted utilitarianism provides a class of objective functions that are often
used for evaluating intertemporal choice.
Even though discounting has sometimes been considered as “irrational” in
the context of individual decision-making, such impatience has still been ac-
cepted as a natural part of exogenously given individual preferences. When
discounting, however, refers to future generations, some fundamental ethi-
cal problems seem to arise. In the case of intergenerational discounting it
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is natural to question whether it is fair to value the utility of future gener-
ations less than that of the present one. This criticism against discounting
has a long tradition in economics, dating back at least to Pigou [22]. It
was revitalized in the ongoing debate on sustainable development, which –
it is sometimes claimed – is in danger when discounting is applied. The
proponents of intergenerational discounting, however, also turn to ethical
reﬂections when they try to justify this procedure. Thus it appears that a
deep ethical conﬂict is present in the debate of the discounting issue.
It is the aim of this paper to evaluate the use of discounting in utili-
tarian social criteria for choice between intergenerational allocations. As a
ﬁrst step, we retrace the ethical arguments of the opponents and the pro-
ponents of intergenerational discounting. As a second step we show that
this debate might be considered misplaced as there is not much room for
a serious controversy on the discounting question. In particular, in many
important technological environments the undiscounted utilitarian criterion
is suﬃciently malleable to allow for the choices the proponents of intergen-
erational discounting seeks to implement by discounting future utilities.
2. Intergenerational discounting as an ethical problem
The position of the opponents against intergenerational discounting is
primarily based on the view that it is not a priori justiﬁed to give diﬀerent
generations unequal weight in social evaluations as – in the light of some
principle of insuﬃcient reason – they do not seem to be fundamentally dif-
ferent, at least if population size is constant and there is no uncertainty.
The only obvious distinction between members of diﬀerent generations is
that they do not appear simultaneously on the time axis, which, however,
does not provide an ethically compelling reason for unequal treatment. If,
under otherwise identical circumstances, welfare comparisons are to be made
in a static context with a ﬁnite number of agents living within the same gen-
eration, one would not usually deny that equal individuals should get equal
consideration in social welfare functions. Therefore, it is quite standard in
welfare economics to adopt an anonymity principle by which discrimination
of particular agents is excluded.
However, discounting does not only seem questionable from its normative
basis but also from its consequences in some technological environments.THE MALLEABILITY OF UNDISCOUNTED UTILITARIANISM 3
When, e.g., the level of production does not only depend on man-made cap-
ital and labor, but also on the input of an exhaustible natural resource (like
oil), applying a discounted utilitarian criterion for any time-invariant and
strictly positive discount rate will, in the long run, force the consumption
level to approach zero, even though positive and non-decreasing consump-
tion is technically feasible. Thus, in such a Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technology
constant and positive utility discounting leads to an outcome which does not
appeal to commonly shared ethical intuitions, and which is not compatible
with sustainable development – i.e. with having no generation enjoy a level
of well-being that cannot be shared by future generations.
As appealing as these ethically motivated arguments against intergenera-
tional discounting may look, there are also important arguments in favor of
the position of the proponents of discounting.
The ﬁrst of these arguments is of a technical nature. If the world does
not come to its end at some predetermined date, it is an ethical impera-
tive to take all these generations into consideration, which is well in line
with the advocates of sustainability. But it is just the fact that the number
of generations are modeled to be inﬁnite that creates speciﬁc problems in
making welfare comparisons. In the inﬁnite case the existence of a socially
most preferred intergenerational allocation cannot be ensured in the same
way as it is usually done in the ﬁnite case, where the Weierstrass theorem
easily applies. This theorem says that on a compact domain a continuous
real valued function will have at least one maximum. In the ﬁnite case,
not very demanding assumptions are needed to ensure that the premises
of this theorem hold so that the existence of maximal elements is ensured.
In the inﬁnite case, however, it is not possible – in relevant technological
environments – to have compactness of the set of feasible allocations and,
at the same time, continuity of social preferences that are sensitive to the
interest of each generation and treat all generations equally (cf. Koopmans
[17] and Diamond [12]). Sensitivity here refers to the ‘Strong Pareto’ axiom
(which we will also call ‘Eﬃciency’), meaning that social preferences must
deem one allocation superior to another if at least one generation is better
oﬀ and no generation is worse oﬀ, while equal treatment refers to the ‘Weak
anonymity’ axiom (which we will also call ‘Equity’), meaning that social
preferences must leave the social valuation of an allocation unchanged when4 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND WOLFGANG BUCHHOLZ
the consumption levels of any two generations along the allocation are per-
muted. The undiscounted utilitarian criterion does, of course, satisfy these
axioms. That this way of establishing existence cannot be generalized to the
inﬁnite case if ‘Equity’ is postulated explains some of the scepticism people
have with this normative precept in the inﬁnite number case. From this
perspective adhering to this axiom may seem rather pointless if it is diﬃcult
to make use of it.
The second argument, however, for the widespread refusal of the ‘Eq-
uity’ axiom in the intergenerational context ﬂows from more direct ethical
reservations. In particular, it is claimed that equal treatment is in con-
ﬂict with ﬁnding an acceptable balance between the interests of diﬀerent
generations. For many important classes of technologies (irrespective of the
non-applicability of the Weierstrass theorem) it is well possible to ﬁnd an or-
dering of feasible allocations that fulﬁlls the ‘Equity’ axiom and determines
a unique best element in the feasibility set. In particular, the undiscounted
utilitarian criterion – appropriately adapted to the case with an inﬁnite
number of generations – will in many cases yield a unique optimal allo-
cation. However, it is often claimed that the application of undiscounted
utilitarianism leads to a distributional imbalance by impairing the earlier
generations to an unacceptable degree. E.g., Rawls ([24], p. 287) argues
that “the utilitarian doctrine may direct us to demand heavy sacriﬁces of
the poorer generations for the sake of greater advantages for the later ones
that are far better oﬀ”, while Dasgupta and M¨ aler ([10], p. 2395) refers to
calculations by Mirrlees [19] and Chakravarty [5] showing in plausible eco-
nomic models that the present generation would be asked to save and invest
around 50 percent of GNP under undiscounted utilitarianism. Thus, with
a very productive economy, the danger exists that maximizing the sum of
undiscounted utilities leads to a growth pattern that requires high savings
rates initially and thereby imposes excessive hardships on earlier genera-
tions. Following such arguments, Rawls ([24], p. 297) reluctantly points
out that “[t]his consequence can be to some degree corrected by discounting
the welfare of those living in the future”, and Arrow ([1], p. 16) concludes
“that the strong ethical requirement that all generations be treated alike,
itself reasonable, contradicts a very strong intuition that it is not morally
acceptable to demand excessively high savings rates of any one generation,
or even of every generation”. To avoid consumption patterns that are tooTHE MALLEABILITY OF UNDISCOUNTED UTILITARIANISM 5
much to the disadvantage of earlier generations, the incorporation of a posi-
tive discount rate into the utilitarian criterion is thus considered inevitable.
Stated in another way, this justiﬁcation of utility discounting entails that
discounting is not only required in order to be able to make choices at all,
but also to ensure that the chosen distributions are ethically acceptable.
The ﬁrst of these arguments – namely the problem of existence when the
axioms of ‘Eﬃciency’ and ‘Equity’ are imposed – has been considered in a
previous work (Asheim, Buchholzand Tungodden [3]). There we show that
the axioms of ‘Eﬃciency’ and ‘Equity’ are not incompatible with the exis-
tence of maximal allocations, given that one considers technologies that are
productive in the sense of satisfying the conditions of ‘Immediate produc-
tivity’ and ‘Eventual productivity’.1 In fact, we show that any eﬃcient and
non-decreasing allocation is maximal if the social preferences over inﬁnite
intergenerational allocations are generated by these axioms.
In the present paper we consider the second of these arguments. We show
within three important classes of technologies that undiscounted utilitari-
anism is so ﬂexible that any eﬃcient and non-decreasing allocation can be
the unique optimal intergenerational allocation under the utilitarian crite-
rion provided that the utility function is appropriately chosen. This means
that, for any member of these classes of technologies, any outcome consistent
with ‘Eﬃciency’ and ‘Equity’ can be realized under undiscounted utilitari-
anism. Thus, undiscounted utilitarianism has no bite beyond these axioms.
Hence, the problem with undiscounted utilitarianism is neither that it does
not allow for optimal allocations nor that it leads to unequal distributions
imposing a too heavy burden on the present generation. Rather, the prob-
lem is that it – as a class of orderings – does not limit the set of optimal
allocations more than the axioms of ‘Eﬃciency’ and ‘Equity’ do.
Throughout the well-being of any generation will be measured by a one-
dimensional indicator ‘consumption’, which comprises everything that af-
fects a generation’s livelihood. It is appropriate to think of ‘consumption’
as the money metric utility that a generation derives from the goods and ser-
vices at its disposal, with the money metric utility function being identical
for all generations. Even though we will prove (cf. Prop. 2) within three
1‘Immediate productivity’ means that there are negative transfer costs from the present
to the future if the future is worse oﬀ than the present, and ‘Eventual productivity’ means
that there exist eﬃcient and completely egalitarian allocations.6 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND WOLFGANG BUCHHOLZ
classes of technologies that any eﬃcient and non-decreasing allocation is
compatible with zero utility discounting, any such allocation will be char-
acterized by a positive consumption interest rate that cannot decrease too
fast (cf. Prop. 1). Our analysis is therefore not an argument against pos-
itive discounting in social cost-beneﬁt analysis, even for decisions relating
to long-term environmental policy (e.g. controlling the greenhouse eﬀect).
However, the consumption interest rate – which will reﬂect net capital pro-
ductivity – will be of a magnitude and have a time structure2 so that the
decisions taken will not undermine the livelihood of future generations.
In the analysis of the present paper the concavity of the utility function
u represents the aversion in social evaluation towards inequality between
generations. Hence, u is not a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function,
where the corresponding concavity would be an expression of risk aversion.
If risk and uncertainty were introduced into our analysis, it would still be
appropriate in principle to distinguish between inequality aversion and risk
aversion (cf. Kreps and Porteus [18]), although this is often not done in prac-
tical applications. Furthermore, even if one follows Harsanyi [15] in arguing
that undiscounted utilitarianism derives its justiﬁcation from hypothetical
decisions under uncertainty in the original position, the risk aversion in his
setting relates to decision problems that are not faced by actual decision-
makers. We therefore claim that the concavity of the utility function u in
the undiscounted utilitarian criterion is not observable in a market economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3 contains a simple numerical
illustration, and Section 4 describes the three classes of technologies that
we will consider. Section 5 explains how the utilitarian criterion is extended
to the evaluation of intergenerational allocations with an inﬁnite number
of generations. The main result is then presented in Sect. 6, while the
concluding Sect. 7 contains a discussion of the results.
3. A numerical illustration
The main argument presented in the present paper is that, within certain
technological environments, any eﬃcient and non-decreasing allocation can
be realized under undiscounted utilitarianism. This means that – given
such a technological environment – an undiscounted utilitarian criterion can
2It may to some extent decrease over time. This is called “slow” (or hyperbolic)
discounting (cf. e.g. Weitzman [29]).THE MALLEABILITY OF UNDISCOUNTED UTILITARIANISM 7
be substituted for any discounted utilitarian criterion that yields a non-
decreasing allocation, without aﬀecting the optimal allocation. The present
section illustrates this possibility within a simple setting where there are
only two generations. Let c1 and c2 denote consumption (or well-being) of
generations 1 and 2, and let the set of feasible allocations be given by:
(c1,c 2) ≥ 0 is feasible if and only if c1 + 1
4c2 ≤ 2.
This linear technology implies that the net capital productivity equals 3
(= 4−1). Let u be the time-invariant utility function and let δ (∈ (0,1]) be
the discount factor. This means that the utility discount rate equals 1/δ−1.











This means that if (c1,c 2)   0, then (c1,c 2) satisﬁes u (c1)=δ4u (c2).
We can now verify that (c1,c 2)=( 1 ,4) is a utilitarian optimum under
both of the following constellations of utility function and discount factor:
u(c)=c1/2 and δ =1 /2
u(c)=l nc and δ =0.
This illustrates how a more concave utility function can substitute for dis-
counting along an allocation where consumption is strictly increasing.
4. Three classes of technologies
In this section we will consider three important classes of technologies and
show – within these classes – that eﬃcient and non-decreasing allocations
can be characterized in a straightforward manner. In any of these technolo-
gies we assume that gross output yt and consumption ct in period t =0 ,1,2
are one-dimensional. Furthermore, kt will denote invested man-made cap-
ital, i.e. the gross output that is not consumed. Write 0y =( y0,y 1,...)
and correspondingly for other sequences. Refer to 0c =( c0,c 1,...)a sa n
allocation. An allocation 0c =( c0,c 1,...)i ss a i dt ob enon-decreasing if
ct+1 ≥ ct for all t ≥ 0a n dstationary if ct+1 = ct for all t ≥ 0. Given a
set of feasible allocations, a feasible allocation 0c =( c0,c 1,...)i ss a i dt o




t ≥ ct for all t ≥ 0, with strict inequality for some t.8 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND WOLFGANG BUCHHOLZ
An arbitrary member of the three classes of the technologies will sat-
isfy the conditions of ‘Immediate productivity’ and ‘Eventual productivity’
(in the terminology of Asheim et al. [3]) under given assumptions. Im-
mediate productivity means that if 0c =( c0,c 1,...,c t,c t+1,...)i sf e a s i b l e
and ct >c t+1,t h e n0c  =( c0,c 1,...,c t+1,c t,...) is feasible and ineﬃcient.
Eventual productivity means that that there, for any initial condition, exists
an eﬃcient and stationary allocation 0c =( c,c,...).
4.1. Linear technologies. A technology is linear if, in any period, the
ratio of gross output and invested man-made capital is ﬁxed and equal to
at. On the other hand, this gross productivity factor can vary between
periods. We assume positive net capital productivity:
at > 1 for all t>0. (A.1)
This assumption means that the condition of ‘Immediate productivity’ is
satisﬁed. Let the transformation set T 1
t in period t be given by
T 1
t = {(k,y)|0 ≤ y ≤ atk}.
Let y>0. A program (0y, 0k)i ss a i dt ob ey-feasible if
y0 = y, and kt ≤ yt and (kt,y t+1) ∈T1
t for all t ≥ 0.
An allocation 0c is said to be y-feasible if there is a y-feasible program
(0y, 0k) such that ct = yt − kt for all t ≥ 0.
A linear technology determines a unique sequence of consumption dis-
count factors 0p =( p0,p 1,...) as follows:
p0 =1 a n d pt+1at = pt for all t ≥ 0.
Note that it holds for all t ≥ 0t h a t0<p t+1 <p t since at > 1. The following
result is useful for the main result of this section.
Lemma 1. An allocation 0c is y-feasible if and only if ct ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0
and
 ∞
t=0 ptct ≤ y.
Proof. Assume that 0c is y-feasible. Then there exists a y-feasible program
(0y, 0k) such that ct = yt − kt ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. In particular, yt+1 ≤ atkt




t=0 pt+1atkt.S i n c e
pt+1at = pt,t h i si m p l i e st h a t
 T−1
t=0 pt(yt − kt) ≤ p0y0 − pTyT.W e n o w
obtain
 ∞
t=0 ptct ≤ y as ptct = pt(yt − kt) ≥ 0, p0y0 = y and pTyT ≥ 0.THE MALLEABILITY OF UNDISCOUNTED UTILITARIANISM 9
Assume that ct ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0a n d
 ∞
t=0 ptct ≤ y.C o n s t r u c t( 0y, 0k)b y
y0 = y,a n dkt = yt−ct and yt+1 = atkt for all t ≥ 0. Then ptct+pt+1yt+1 =
ptyt−ptkt+pt+1atkt = ptyt, implying that
 ∞
s=t pscs ≤ ptyt.A spscs ≥ 0f o r
all s ≥ t, it follows that yt ≥ 0 for arbitrary t,a n d( 0y, 0k)i sy-feasible.
The set of eﬃcient and non-decreasing y-feasible allocations is non-empty
if the following condition holds
 ∞
t=0
pt < ∞, (E.1)
since then the stationary allocation 0c =( c,c,...)w i t hc = y




is y-feasible. If, on the other hand, (E.1) does not hold, then this set is empty.
This means that a linear technology satisﬁes ‘Eventual productivity’ if and
only if (E.1) is satisﬁed. An increasing sequence of gross productivity factors
– i.e. 0a =( a0,a 1,...) satisﬁes at+1 >a t for all t ≥ 0 – can be interpreted
as exogeneous technological progress. Condition (E.1) clearly holds if a0 > 1
and 0a is non-decreasing.
4.2. Ramsey technologies. A Ramsey technology (cf. Ramsey [23]) is
determined by a stationary production function g : R+ → R+ that satisﬁes
g is concave, continuous for k ≥ 0,
and twice diﬀerentiable for k>0.
g(0) = 0,g   > 0f o rk>0,
g (k) →∞ as k ↓ 0a n d
g (k) ↓ 0a sk →∞.
(A.2)
This assumption implies that the condition of ‘Immediate productivity’ (in
the terminology of Asheim et al. [3]) is satisﬁed. Let the gross output
function f be given by f(k)=g(k)+k for all k ≥ 0. The transformation
set T 2 is time-invariant and is given by
T 2 = {(k,y)|0 ≤ y ≤ f(k);k ≥ 0}.
Let y>0. A program (0y, 0k)i ss a i dt ob ey-feasible if
y0 = y, and kt ≤ yt and (kt,y t+1) ∈T2 for all t ≥ 0.10 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND WOLFGANG BUCHHOLZ
An allocation 0c is said to be y-feasible if there is a y-feasible program
(0y, 0k), where 0k is bounded above,3 such that ct = yt − kt for all t ≥ 0.
A y-feasible program (0y, 0k)i scompetitive if there is a non-null sequence
of nonnegative prices 0p such that for t ≥ 0,
pt+1yt+1 − ptkt ≥ pt+1y − ptk for all (k,y) ∈T2 .
In other words, along a competitive program intertemporal proﬁts are max-
imized at each point in time. A competitive program is said to satisfy the
transversality condition at the price sequence 0p if
limT→∞pTkT =0.
Lemma 2. Under (A.2), if a y-feasible and non-decreasing allocation 0c is
eﬃcient, then there exists a y-feasible program (0y, 0k) with ct = yt − kt
for all t ≥ 0 that is competitive and satisﬁes the transversality condition at
prices 0p given by
pt+1f (kt)=pt for t ≥ 0.
Furthermore, it holds that, for all t ≥ 0, 0 <p t+1 <p t,a n d
 ∞
t=0 ptct < ∞.
Proof. Assume that the y-feasible allocation 0c is eﬃcient and non-decreasing.
Construct (0y, 0k)b yy0 = y,a n dkt = yt−ct and yt+1 = f(kt) for all t ≥ 0.
Since 0c is y-feasible and eﬃcient, it follows that there exists ¯ k such that
0 <k t < ¯ k for all t ≥ 0. Since, in addition, 0c is non-decreasing, it follows
that g(kt) − ct+1 = kt+1 − kt ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. Determine a sequence of
consumption discount factors 0p =( p0,p 1,...) as follows:
p0 =1 a n d pt+1f (kt)=pt for all t ≥ 0.
Note that it holds for all t ≥ 0t h a t0<p t+1 <p t since f (kt)=g (kt)+1>
1. By the concavity of g it follows that (0y, 0k) is competitive. Since kt < ¯ k
for all t ≥ 0, it follows that (0y, 0k) satisﬁes the transversality condition:
pTkT ≤ δT¯ k,w h e r eδ := 1/f (¯ k). Finally, since ct ≤ g(kt−1) ≤ g(¯ k) for all




t=0 δtg(¯ k) < ∞.
The set of eﬃcient and non-decreasing y-feasible allocations is non-empty
since the stationary allocation 0c =( c,c,...)w h e r ec>0s o l v e sy = f(y−c)
3I.e. given 0k there exists ¯ k such that kt ≤ ¯ k for all t ≥ 0. This assumption is made in
order for the Ramsey model to have ‘ﬁnite consumption value’ (i.e.
 ∞
t=0 ptct < ∞)an d
thereby enable Prop. 1 below to be established.THE MALLEABILITY OF UNDISCOUNTED UTILITARIANISM 11
is y-feasible. Hence, any Ramsey technology satisﬁes ‘Eventual productiv-
ity’.
4.3. Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technologies. A Dasgupta-Heal-Solow tech-
nology (cf. Dasgupta and Heal [8] and Solow [26]) is determined by a sta-
tionary production function G : R3
+ → R+ that satisﬁes
G is concave, non-decreasing, homogeneous of
degree one, and continuous for (k,r, ) ≥ 0,
G is twice diﬀerentiable
and satisﬁes (Gk,G r,G  )   0f o r( k,r, )   0.
G(k,0, )=0=G(0,r, )
Given any (k ,r )   0, there is η  > 0 such that for all (k,r)
satisfying k ≥ k ,0 <r≤ r , we have [rGr(k,r,1)]/G (k,r,1) ≥ η  .
(A.3)
This assumption implies that the condition of ‘Immediate productivity’ is
satisﬁed. Note that both capital kt and resource extraction rt are essential in
production. The available labor force is assumed to be stationary and equal
to 1. Still, labor needs to be explicitly considered in order to state the latter
part of (A.3), namely that the ratio of the share of the resource in net output
to the share of labor in net output is assumed to be bounded away from zero.
Let the gross output function F be given by F(k,r)=G(k,r,1) + k for all
(k,r) ≥ 0. The transformation set T 3 is time-invariant and is given by
T 3 = {[(k,m),(y,m )|0 ≤ y ≤ F(k,r);0 ≤ r = m − m ,(k,m ) ≥ 0}.
Let (y,m)   0, where m is the available resource stock at time 0. A program
(0y, 0m, 0k)i ss a i dt ob e( y,m)-feasible if
y0 = y and m0 = m
kt ≤ yt and [(kt,m t),(yt+1,m t+1)] ∈T3 for all t ≥ 0.
An allocation 0c is said to be (y,m)-feasible if there is a (y,m)-feasible
program (0y, 0m, 0k) such that ct = yt − kt for all t ≥ 0.
A( y,m)-feasible program (0y, 0m, 0k)i scompetitive if there is a non-null
sequence of nonnegative prices (0p, 0q) such that for t ≥ 0,
pt+1yt+1 + qt+1mt+1 − ptkt − qtmt ≥ pt+1y + qt+1m  − ptk − qtm
for all [(k,m)(y,m )] ∈T3 .12 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND WOLFGANG BUCHHOLZ
A competitive program is said to satisfy the transversality condition at the
price sequence (0p, 0q)i f
limT→∞(pTkT + qTmT)=0.
Lemma 3. Under (A.3), if a (y,m)-feasible and non-decreasing allocation
0c is eﬃcient, then there exists a y-feasible program (0y, 0m, 0k) with ct =
yt − kt for all t ≥ 0 that is competitive and satisﬁes the transversality con-
dition at prices (0p, 0q) given by
pt+1Fk(kt,m t − mt+1)=pt for t ≥ 0
qt = q>0 and pt+1Fr(kt,m t − mt+1)=q for t ≥ 0.
Furthermore, it holds that, for all t ≥ 0, 0 <p t+1 <p t,a n d
 ∞
t=0 ptct < ∞.
Proof. Let s   ≥ 0 be the ﬁrst period with positive consumption: cs   > 0
and ct =0f o r0≤ t<s   . Then, by Prop. 2 in Dasgupta and Mitra [11],
kt+1 >k t > 0a n d0<m t+1 <m t for t ≥ s  .L e t s ,w h e r e0≤ s  ≤ s  ,
be the ﬁrst period with positive extraction: rs  = ms  − ms +1 > 0a n d
rt = mt − mt+1 =0f o r0≤ t<s  .I f s  > 0, then (A.3) implies that the
resulting allocation is ineﬃcient, since a Pareto-dominating allocation can
be constructed by having r 
s −1 =  >0a n dr 
s  = rs  − >0 (for suﬃciently
small  ) and reinvesting the additional output at time s  − 1. Thus, s  =0 .
Hence, kt > 0a n drt = mt − mt+1 > 0f o rt ≥ 0. The result now follows
from Thm. 4.1 and Cor. 4.1 in Mitra [20].
Assumption (A.3) is not suﬃcient to ensure the existence of a station-
ary allocation with positive consumption. Therefore assume the following
condition.
There exists from any (y,m)   0
a stationary allocation with positive consumption.
(E.3)
Dasgupta and Mitra [11] show within the setting of Dasgupta-Heal-Solow
technologies that this implies the existence of an eﬃcient and stationary al-
location. This means that a Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technology satisﬁes ‘Even-
tual productivity’ and has a non-empty set of eﬃcient and non-decreasing
(y,m)-feasible allocations if (E.3) holds. We state (E.3) in its reduced formTHE MALLEABILITY OF UNDISCOUNTED UTILITARIANISM 13
since it is outside the scope of the present paper to provide primitive tech-
nological conditions.4
The importance of Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technologies in a discussion of
intergenerational justice derives from the property that net capital produc-
tivity Gk(k,r, ) decreases and approaches zero along any eﬃcient and non-
decreasing allocation. This occurs in a stationary technology setting due to
the dwindling availability of the resource.
4.4. A characterization result for eﬃcient and non-decreasing al-
locations. Lemmas 1–3 mean that we can establish the following result.
Proposition 1. Assume (A.1)–(A.3). Consider a member of the classes
of linear, Ramsey or Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technologies. If a y-feasible (or
(y,m)-feasible) allocation 0c =( c0,c 1,...) is eﬃcient and non-decreasing,
then there exists a sequence of consumption discount factors 0p =( p0,p 1,...)







for any y-feasible (or (y,m)-feasible) allocation 0c  =( c 
0,c  
1,...).
Proof. Part 1: Linear technologies. The result follows immediately from
Lemma 1, since
 ∞
t=0 ptct = y (< ∞)i f0c is y-feasible and eﬃcient, and
 ∞
t=0 ptc 
t ≤ y if 0c  is y-feasible.
Part 2: Ramsey technologies. Lemma 2 establishes the existence of a y-
feasible program (0y, 0k)w i t hct = yt − kt for all t ≥ 0 that is competitive
and satisﬁes the transversality condition at prices 0p satisfying 0 <p t+1 <p t
for all t ≥ 0 such that
 ∞






t − k 
t) − (yt − kt)]
≤ p0(y 
0 − y0) − pT(k 
T − kT) ≤ pTkT ,
where 0c  is any y-feasible allocation with (0y , 0k ) as a corresponding y-
feasible program, since (0y, 0k) is competitive, y 





t − ct) ≤ 0s i n c e( 0y, 0k) satisﬁes the transversality
condition.
Part 3: Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technologies. Lemma 3 establishes the ex-
istence of a (y,m)-feasible program (0y, 0m, 0k)w i t hct = yt − kt for all
4Cass and Mitra [4] give necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the production function
G for (E.3) to hold.14 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND WOLFGANG BUCHHOLZ
t ≥ 0 that is competitive and satisﬁes the transversality condition at prices
(0p, 0q), where 0p satisﬁes 0 <p t+1 <p t for all t ≥ 0, such that
 ∞
t=0 ptct <






t − k 
t) − (yt − kt)]
≤ p0(y 
0 − y0)+q0(m 
0 − m0)
− [pT(k 
T − kT)] + qT(m 
T − mT)]
≤ pTkT + qTmT ,
where 0c  is any (y,m)-feasible allocation with (0y , 0m , 0k ) as a corre-
sponding (y,m)-feasible program, since (0y, 0m, 0k) is competitive, y 
0 =
y0 = y, m 
0 = m0 = m,a n dpTk 
T + qTm 
T ≥ 0. Finally,
 ∞
t=0 pt(c 
t −ct) ≤ 0
since (0y, 0m, 0k) satisﬁes the transversality condition.
5. Evaluating Intergenerational Allocations
The motivation for this paper is to show that – within the considered
classes of technologies – any eﬃcient and non-decreasing allocation is the
unique optimum according to undiscounted utilitarianism for some choice of
utility function. There are problems associated with this exercise.
1. In the context of an inﬁnite number of generations the sum of undis-
counted utilities will generally diverge. This means that one has to in-
voke the ‘catching up’ criterion, under which one allocation is as good
as another if the liminf, as T goes to inﬁnity, of the sum up to time
T of the diﬀerence between the utilities generated by the allocations is
nonnegative.
2. The utility function may have to be chosen such that marginal util-
ity is zero beyond some consumption level. This means that undis-
counted utilitarianism will not satisfy the axiom of ‘Eﬃciency’ (or
‘Strong Pareto’; cf. Sect. 2) unless some amendment is introduced.
An amendment that works is to the introduce a second order and
strictly increasing utility function that is applied lexicographically to
resolve ties.
3. Even with such lexicographic optimization, the resulting reﬂexive and
transitive binary relation will not necessarily be complete. However, to
complete the binary relation, one can invoke a result due to Szpilrajn
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Hence, the class of binary relations that we will consider consists of the
following components:
• A ﬁrst-order utility function u : R+ → R that is continuous, concave
and non-decreasing, and which will be constructed for each eﬃcient and
non-decreasing allocation such that this allocation will be the unique
utilitarian optimum.
• A second-order utility function v : R+ → R that is continuous and
strictly increasing so that the axiom of ‘Eﬃciency’ is satisﬁed. For this
purpose we will assume throughout that v is given by v(c)=c.
• Given u, a complete and transitive binary relation Ru that is a com-
pletion of ‘catching up’-utilitarianism when these utility functions are
used lexicographically.
We will ﬁrst show how an incomplete reﬂexive and transitive binary rela-
tion R∗
u can be constructed on the basis of u. Then we consider the issue of
completing R∗
u to Ru.
Let 0c  =( c 
0,c  
1,...)a n d0c   =( c  
0,c   
1,...) be two allocations. Let u be
given, and determine R∗
u as follows.
0c  R∗
u 0c   ⇔

   









t) − v(c  




t) − u(c  
t)) = 0.
It is straightforward to show that R∗
u is reﬂexive and transitive. Let P∗
u and
I∗
u denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of R∗
u, respectively; i.e. P∗
u
denotes (strict) preference, while I∗
u denotes indiﬀerence. If 0c  is derived
from 0c   by having c 
s = c  
s +  ,  >0, and c 
t = c  
t for t  = s,t h e n0c  P∗
u 0c  
since – even if u(c 
s)=u(c  
s) – we do have that v(c 
s) >v (c  
s). This means
that R∗
u satisﬁes the axiom of ‘Eﬃciency’ (or ‘Strong Pareto’). If 0c  is
derived from 0c   by having c 
s  = c  
s  , c 
s   = c  
s ,a n dc 
t = c  
t for t  = s ,s   ,
then 0c  I∗
u 0c   since
 ∞
t=0(u(c 
t) − u(c  
t)) = 0 and
 ∞
t=0(v(c 
t) − v(c  
t)) = 0.
This means that R∗
u satisﬁes the axiom of ‘Equity’ (or ‘Weak anonymity’).
By invoking Svensson’s [27] Thm. 2, there exists a complete and transitive
binary relation Ru which has R∗
u as a subrelation.5 Svensson’s [27] Thm. 2
5R
  is said to be a subrelation to R

















  ,w i t hP
  and P
   denoting the asymmetric parts of R
  and
R
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states that any reﬂexive and transitive binary relation that satisﬁes the ax-
ioms of ‘Eﬃciency’ and ‘Equity’ is a subrelation to a complete and transitive
binary relation (i.e. an ordering). In proving this result Svensson refers to a
general mathematical lemma by Szpilrajn [43]. Note that it follows from the
deﬁnition of a subrelation that also Ru satisﬁes the axioms of ‘Eﬃciency’
and ‘Equity’. For our purpose we need not be concerned about how R∗
u is
completed to Ru. Because we will show that the considered eﬃcient and
decreasing allocation will P∗
u-dominate any alternative feasible allocation
for an appropriately chosen u. Then it follows that the considered eﬃcient
and decreasing allocation will Pu-dominate any alternative allocation, in-
dependently of how R∗
u is completed to Ru. We will refer to an ordering
Ru constructed as explained above as an extended undiscounted utilitarian
criterion.
6. Main Result
We have in the two previous sections established the parts on which our
main result will be based. We ﬁrst characterized eﬃcient and non-decreasing
allocations in three important classes of technologies. We then formulated an
undiscounted utilitarian criterion to evaluate intergenerational allocations
with an inﬁnite number of generations. We will in this section use these
ingredients to show how any eﬃcient and non-decreasing allocation in the
context of any technology in these classes is the unique optimum according
to undiscounted utilitarianism for some choice of utility function.
Proposition 2. Assume (A.1)–(A.3). Consider a member of the classes
of linear, Ramsey or Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technologies. If a y-feasible (or
(y,m)-feasible) allocation 0c =( c0,c 1,...) is eﬃcient and non-decreasing,
then there exists an extended undiscounted utilitarian criterion Ru such that
0cP u 0c  for any y-feasible (or (y,m)-feasible) allocation 0c  =( c 
0,c  
1,...)
that does not coincide with 0c.
Proof. Since any R∗
u can be extended to a complete and transitive binary
relation Ru to which R∗
u is a subrelation, it is suﬃcient to show that there
exists u such that 0cP∗
u 0c  for any y-feasible (or (y,m)-feasible) allocation
0c  (because 0cP∗
u 0c  implies 0cP u 0c  for any completion).
By Prop. 1 there exists a sequence of consumption discount factors 0p =
(p0,p 1,...) satisfying 0 <p t+1 <p t for all t ≥ 0 such that ∞ >
 ∞







































Figure 1. Illustration of the proof of Prop. 2.
 ∞
t=0 ptc 
t for any y-feasible (or (y,m)-feasible) allocation 0c .C o n s t r u c t a
continuous, concave, and non-decreasing utility function u as follows. Let
u0 ∈ (p0,∞)a n dut ∈ (pt+1,p t)f o rt ≥ 1.




ut · (ct − ct−1) − utc · (ctc − c),
where c−1 := 0. Note that u is a piece-wise linear, continuous and concave
function, with u(0) = 0 and with the slope on each linear segment (ct,c t+1)
lying strictly between pt+1 and pt.I fs u p {ct|t ∈ N} = ∞,t h e nu has been
constructed. Otherwise, write ¯ c := sup{ct|t ∈ N}.S i n c eu is continuous and
non-decreasing on [0,¯ c), limc↑¯ c u(c) exists; write ¯ u := limc↑¯ c u(c). Complete
the construction of u by setting u(c)=¯ u for c ≥ sup{ct|t ∈ N}.
Note that u is constructed so that, for each t ≥ 0,
u(ct) − ptct ≥ u(c) − ptc
for any c ≥ 0, with the inequality being strict if c  = ct.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
liminfT→∞
 T
t=0(u(ct) − u(c 
t)) ≥
 ∞
t=0 pt(ct − c 
t) ≥ 0,
for any y-feasible (or (y,m)-feasible) allocation 0c , with the ﬁrst inequality
being strict if 0c  = 0c . This means that 0cP∗
u 0c  if 0c  = 0c .18 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND WOLFGANG BUCHHOLZ
The construction of the continuous and piece-wise linear utility function
u is shown in Fig. 1, thereby illustrating the proof of Prop. 2. An extension
of the preceding analysis shows that a diﬀerentiable utility function can be
obtained if and only if 0c is strictly increasing.
7. Discussion
Our main result (Prop. 2) should not necessarily be interpreted as sup-
port for undiscounted utilitarianism. Rather, it is in some sense a converse
of the result that we established in Asheim et al. [3]. There we showed that
the rather uncontroversial ethical axioms of ‘Eﬃciency’ and ‘Equity’ rule out
any allocation that is not eﬃcient and non-decreasing in technologies that
satisfy the conditions of ‘Immediate productivity’ and ‘Eventual productiv-
ity’. All members of the three classes of technologies that we have considered
here satisfy ‘Immediate productivity’ under the assumptions of (A.1)–(A.3),
and they satisfy ‘Eventual productivity’ provided that (E.1) and (E.3) are
satisﬁed. Hence, ‘Eﬃciency’ and ‘Equity’ alone rule out any allocation that
is not eﬃcient and non-decreasing. Here, we have showed within these tech-
nological environments that any eﬃcient and non-decreasing allocation can
be a unique undiscounted utilitarian optimum for an appropriate chosen
utility function. Hence, the class of undiscounted utilitarian criteria – any
member of which satisﬁes ‘Eﬃciency’ and ‘Equity’ – is suﬃciently malleable
to allow for any eﬃcient and non-decreasing allocation to be the unique
choice. This may be taken to mean that no eﬃcient and non-decreasing
allocation can be ruled out solely from ethical consideration, at least in the
three classes of technologies that we consider.
This is a negative conclusion in the sense that adopting undiscounted util-
itarianism as a class of social preferences does not indicate how to provide
a sharper prescription for choice among feasible allocations – unless one has
a speciﬁc ethical intuition concerning the concavity of the utility function
which, however, seems hard to obtain on the basis of ethical axioms alone.
In Ramsey technologies discounted utilitarianism with a positive and time-
invariant discount rate is one alternative that – even as an entire class of
criteria – yields sharper prescriptions. Suppose that the discount rate is
chosen to be smaller or equal to g (k(y)), where k(y)s o l v e sy = f(k(y)) for
given y. Then discounted utilitarianism applied to the Ramsey model will,
quite independently of the shape of the utility function, lead to an eﬃcientTHE MALLEABILITY OF UNDISCOUNTED UTILITARIANISM 19
Table 1. Results on undiscounted and discounted utilitarianism.
Ramsey D-H-S
technologies technologies
Undiscounted All allocations All allocations
utilitarianism consistent with consistent with
‘Eﬃc.’ & ‘Equity’ ‘Eﬃc.’ & ‘Equity’
Discounted More equal alloc. No allocation
utilitarianism consistent with consistent with
‘Eﬃc.’ & ‘Equity’ ‘Eﬃc.’ & ‘Equity’
and non-decreasing allocation. In fact, the stock of capital cannot grow to
a size that exceeds ¯ k,w h e r eg (¯ k) equals the utility discount rate.6 This
means that consumption cannot grow beyond g(¯ k), and thus, the introduc-
tion of such a “small” utility discount rate excludes allocations with a large
inequality between the present and unfortunate generations and the future
and fortunate generations. Hence, even though discounted utilitarianism as
a criterion for social decision-making is inconsistent with the axiom of ‘Eq-
uity’, in Ramsey technologies it leads to outcomes that are consistent with
‘Eﬃciency’ and ‘Equity’ as long as the discount rate is suﬃciently “small”.
This attractive feature of discounted utilitarianism arises in Ramsey tech-
nologies since an eﬃcient and stationary allocation has constant net capital
productivity g (k(y)). In a Dasgupta-Heal-Solow, however, the net capital
productivity Gk(k,r, ) decreases and approaches zero along any eﬃcient
and non-decreasing allocation. This means that discounted utilitarianism
will force consumption to approach zero in the long run, independently of
how “small” the discount rate is, even if (E.3) is satisﬁed so that the set of ef-
ﬁcient and non-decreasing allocations is non-empty. This in turn implies that
6Since the application of such a “small” discount rate leads to kt being bounded above,
the resulting allocation is y-feasible in the terminology of Sect. 4.2 (cf. footnote 3).
Hence, Prop. 2 applies and the given discounted utilitarian criterion can be substituted
by an extended undiscounted utilitarian criterion (cf. Joshi [16] for a related but diﬀer-
ent statement in a special case of the Ramsey model). Thus, the introduction of pure
time preference, which may appear to be without “intrinsic ethical appeal” and therefore
“purely ad hoc” (Rawls [24], p. 298), is not needed to obtain appealing allocations in
Ramsey technologies.20 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND WOLFGANG BUCHHOLZ
discounted utilitarianism is what Page ([21], p. 198) calls a “fair weather
criterion” that necessarily leads to outcomes inconsistent with the axioms
of ‘Eﬃciency’ and ‘Equity’ in the more severe context of a Dasgupta-Heal-
Solow technology. These results are summarized in Table 1.
These conclusions mean that – although discounted utilitarianism appeals
to our ethical intuitions in the simple environment of Ramsey technologies
– introducing positive discounting is not in general an appropriate way of
achieving ethically desirable outcomes. In contrast, undiscounted utilitari-
anism is suﬃciently malleable so that any ethically desirable outcome can
be realized as long as such an allocation is consistent with ‘Eﬃciency’ and
‘Equity’. Hence, in the context of utilitarianism there appears to be no
ethical argument in favor of discounting.
Determining an intergenerational allocation amounts to nothing else than
resolving the distributional conﬂict between the diﬀerent generations. Fol-
lowing Atkinson [2] it is quite familiar in economics to have distributional
objectives incorporated in symmetric additive social welfare functions where
the consumption (or income) of every economic agent is evaluated by some
utility function u. Then the degree of inequality aversion contained in the
social welfare function is expressed by the degree of concavity of the utility
function u (cf. Cowell [7] for a general overview and Collard [6] for a speciﬁc
application in the intergenerational context). In the static case this leads
to a completely egalitarian distribution unless there are costs of redistribu-
tion. In the present intergenerational context, the condition of ‘Immediate
productivity’ means that there are negative transfer costs from the present
to the future. Referring to Okun’s well-known “leaking bucket”, Schelling
([25], p. 396) vividly describes such a situation by using the term ‘incubation
bucket’ in which “the good things multiply in transit so that more arrives at
the destination than was removed from the origin.” Hence, if such produc-
tivity of the technology is assumed, eﬃcient and non-decreasing allocations
are consistent with maximization of a symmetric additive welfare function.
This means that the familiar welfarist approach might be attractive to apply
also for evaluating intergenerational allocations, even in the inﬁnite case.7
7Following partly the same line of argument, Schelling ([25], p. 401) concludes: “The
discount-rate question should disappear. In its place is what utility function to use in
valuing future increments in other people’s consumption. This is a real question, not a
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That a more concave u can substitute for a higher discount rate in skewing
the intergenerational distribution in favor of earlier generations, thus slow-
ing economic growth, has by interpreting the well-known Ramsey rule for
optimal economic growth been observed for a long time (see e.g. Dasgupta
and Heal [9], p. 292, as well as Fleurbaey and Michel [13], p. 294, and [14], p.
723). Here, we have shown in the context of linear and Ramsey technologies
that whatever decreased inequality is implied by discounting can also be ob-
tained by choosing a more concave utility function, since the utility function
can always be adjusted so that a given eﬃcient and non-decreasing alloca-
tion is obtained as the optimal choice without discounting. Such adjustment
is even possible in Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technologies, where discounted util-
itarianism, for any positive and constant discounting, leads to unacceptable
treatment of generations in the distant future. Thus, this malleability of
undiscounted utilitarianism makes it possible in the intergenerational con-
text to determine optimal allocations that appeal to our ethical intuitions
through applying complete and transitive social preferences that satisfy rea-
sonable ethical axioms.
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